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The M&A strategies of businesses operating on a platform model 
have received scant academic attention, despite the economic predominance 
of platform firms and the aggressiveness of their acquisition programs. In 
addition to undertaking more acquisitions than non-platform firms of similar 
economic stature, leading platform firms often pursue unrelated 
targets, against the majority of studies in M&A literature that pinpoints 
business relatedness as the key mechanism for synergy creation. This study 
examines how platform firms differ from non-platform firms in selecting 
acquisition targets and what influences their propensity to acquire targets 
with a low level of relatedness. It begins by investigating two unique and 
fundamental traits of platform businesses that distinguish them from non-
platform businesses: their governance of ecosystems, rather than mere 
products and services, and their possession of an installed base, which 
grants them the leverage to venture into new industries with comparative 
ease. Based on these two characteristics, this paper argues that platform 
 ii 
firms are more inclined to take over firms with a larger relatedness gap than 
non-platform firms. Furthermore, as their installed bases increase, platform 
businesses more frequently utilize unrelated acquisitions to expand into 
industries distant from their core business domain. An analysis of 1,027 
acquisitions completed between 2009 and 2019 by firms listed in the 
NASDAQ-100 supports these arguments. In addition to performing the first 
empirical analysis of the M&A activity of platform businesses in a multi-
industry context, this study contributes to the development of an integrative 
view that connects the fragmented understanding of platforms by utilizing a 
comprehensive definition of platforms and a classification system that 
categorizes platforms into three different types based on their primary 
function (innovation platforms, transaction platforms, and integrated 
platforms). 
 
Keywords : platform businesses, unrelated acquisitions, unrelated M&A, target 
selection, platform business model  
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Businesses operating on a platform model have become some of the 
most powerful and far-reaching business in the world. Platform businesses 
comprise seven of the top ten businesses listed on the NASDAQ-100, a 
value-weighted index that contains the 100 largest U.S. and non-U.S. 
companies trading on the NASDAQ. Furthermore, these seven firms—
Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Facebook, Intel, and Cisco—account 
for nearly 50 percent of the index the by weight. The tremendous economic 
power of platform businesses has important implications, as they are 
fundamentally different from traditional pipeline businesses in two critical 
ways: their governance of ecosystems, rather than mere products and 
services, and their possession of an installed base. These two unique and 
fundamental traits of platform businesses drive them to actively pursue 
acquisitions of target firms with low business relatedness, a pattern contrary 
to the dominant logic of literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). For 
decades, many scholars have cited relatedness as a critical component of 
synergy creation and M&A success (Rumelt, 1982; Kusewitt, 1985; 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005).  
Against traditional logic, platform firms are acquiring unrelated 
target firms and increasingly expanding into industries distant from their 
core industry. Often, platform businesses enter industries that have not yet 
been influenced by the Internet, engaging in direct competition with pipeline 
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businesses (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a; Dolata, 2017; Van 
Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). For example, Google, which 
began as a search engine, and Amazon, which began as a book 
retailer, have both moved into the home hardware industry 
(Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a; Dolata, 2017; Van Alstyne, 
Parker & Choudary, 2016). Their expansions were bolstered by 
acquisitions of companies operating in the chosen industry: Google 
acquired thermostat manufacturer Nest Labs in 2011, and Amazon 
acquired doorbell manufacturer Ring in February 2018, upon which 
the two platform companies expanded their home appliance 
offerings, respectively (SDC Platinum, 2019). Both Google and 
Amazon now offer a wide range of home products, from speakers 
and home cameras to thermostats and doorbells. 
Over the past twenty years, scholars have examined various 
aspects of platform strategy, though none have empirically examined 
what this paper singles out as a critical component in facilitating the 
rise of platform businesses: their M&A strategies. Prior research has 
mainly focused on the influence of network effects (Hagiu, 2006; 
Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005), platform competition (Cennamo & 
Santalo, 2013; McIntyre & Subramaniam, 2009), and ecosystem 
governance (Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2009; Zhu & Iansiti, 
2012). To the best of my knowledge, two prior works have noted the 
key role acquisitions play in facilitating platform businesses’ 
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expansion into new industries. However, these works were case studies of a 
few focal firms (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) or of one focal firm 
(Toppenberg, Henningsson & Eaton, 2016), limiting the scope of their 
findings. Therefore, this paper aims to generate generalizable insights into a 
key strategy facilitating the rapid growth of platform businesses in a wide 
variety of industries.  
In addition, considerable uncertainty still surrounds the both the 
practical and academic understanding of platform business models (Evans & 
Gawer, 2016; Gawer, 2012). No widely accepted definition of platform 
businesses yet exists (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019b). Prior research 
has been split according to different schools of thought, with most focusing 
on specific types and aspects of this business model and neglecting key 
overarching characteristics of platform businesses (Gawer, 2014; McIntyre 
& Srinivasan, 2017). Furthermore, platform businesses have evolved far 
beyond the early conceptualizations of platforms used in many influential 
studies on platform businesses, such as Gawer and Cusumano’s 2002 book 
(Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a). Therefore, in addition to analyzing 
the M&A activities of platform businesses, this study aims to contribute to a 
nascent stream of research that advances a holistic view of platform 




THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Defining and Classifying Platform Businesses 
 Many challenges have hindered the formation of a clear and 
comprehensive definition of platform businesses. First, literature on 
platforms has been divided along multiple theoretical perspectives that have 
developed separately from one another and have employed different 
conceptualizations of platforms (Gawer, 2014; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 
2017; Wan, Cenamor, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2017). However, key 
constructs from the disparate operationalizations that have emerged often 
overlap and interact (Gawer, 2014; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017; Staykova 
& Damsgaard, 2017). Therefore, an integrated approach is necessary to 
foster a deeper understanding of how the combination of these forces shape 
platform businesses. Second, platform businesses have evolved over time, 
necessitating a corresponding shift in their conceptualization. Cusumano, 
Gawer, and Yoffie (2019a) acknowledge that their “definition of the term 
‘platform’ has evolved over the years from an initial focus on what today we 
would call industry innovation platforms” to a much broader form. 
Furthermore, platform businesses nowadays are profoundly affected by the 
increasing ubiquity of digital technology, which definitions must account 
for (Evans, Hagiu & Schmalensee, 2006; Evans & Gawer, 2016; Cusumano, 
Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a).  
 ５ 
Following Cusumano, Gawer, and Yoffie (2019a), this study defines 
platform businesses as those who “bring together individuals and 
organizations so they can innovate or interact in ways not otherwise possible, 
with the potential for nonlinear increase in utility and value.” Although this 
definition encompasses all the fundamental characteristics essential to 
platform businesses—which will be explained in further detail in subsequent 
sections—it is important to acknowledge that platform businesses are not a 
monolith (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a, 2019b; Evans & Gawer, 
2016). To capture the considerable variability between platform businesses, 
a three-part classification system divides them into three types based on 
their core value propositions: innovation platforms, transaction platforms, 
and integrated platforms (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a, 2019b; Evans 
& Gawer, 2016). The main schools of thought that contribute to the 
definition and classification system used in this paper are the engineering 
design perspective, which conceptualizes platforms as technological 
architectures, and the industrial economics perspective, which 
conceptualizes platforms as markets.  
 
Innovation Platforms 
The engineering design perspective has focused on the role of 
platform businesses in establishing the architecture for an innovation 
ecosystem, anchored by a core product, technology, or service accompanied 
by relevant building blocks with which independent third parties can 
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develop complements (Eisenmann, 2006; Evans, Hagiu & 
Schmalensee, 2006; Gawer, 2011, 2014; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; 
Gawer & Henderson, 2007; Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1997; 
Muffatto & Moveda, 2002). These types of platforms will be 
classified as innovation platforms, as per previous usage by Evans 
and Gawer (2016) and Gawer, Yoffie, and Cusumano (2019a). 
Complements are products and services that work in conjunction 
with and increase the value of the core by providing additional 
functionalities (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1997; Gawer, 2014; 
Yoffie & Kwak, 2006; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012). Although the company 
playing the focal role in the ecosystem sometimes develops 
complementary applications, it is more common for the firm to 
provide ecosystem participants with the tools to develop 
complements, such as application programming interfaces 
(Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a). 
The innovation platform’s role is to maximize value creation 
in the ecosystem by bringing on complementors who will develop 
complements that will contribute the most value possible, and by 
leading industrywide innovation. The presence of network effects 
amplifies the benefits of complements: the more numerous and 
higher quality available complements are, the more attractive the 
platform becomes to different groups, such as other complementors, 
end users, investors, and advertisers (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 
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2019a; Schilling, 1999; Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Wade, 1995; Zhu & Iansiti, 
2012). Innovation firms often capture value by directly selling or renting a 
product that is the result of such ecosystem-driven innovation (Cusumano, 
Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a, 2019b). 
Intel, which produces the microprocessors that function as the 
engines for personal computers (PC), is a classic example of an innovation 
platform. (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Evans & Gawer, 2016; Gawer & 
Henderson, 2007; Tatsumoto, Ogawa & Fujimoto, 2009). Leveraging its 
position as the leading producer of a foundational component, Intel designed 
the PC system architecture, setting the compatibility standards for how other 
complementary components of the PC would interact with its 
microprocessors (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002). Intel also actively supported 
the innovation of other ecosystem participants so they could innovate with 
the same speed and direction as Intel, creating the best end product possible 
and ultimately growing overall demand for PCs (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; 
Gawer & Henderson, 2007; Gawer & Cusumano, 2016). This granted Intel 
much influence over not only complementors, but suppliers and end users as 
well (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002).  
 
Transaction Platforms 
The industrial economics perspective conceptualizes platforms as 
multi-sided markets that facilitate interactions between different sides of the 
market (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a, 2019b; Evans & Schmalensee, 
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2009; Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2006; Evans & Gawer, 
2016; Hagiu, 2006, 2014; Rochet & Tirole 2003). The platform 
merely provides the interface for and mediates the transaction, 
without controlling or owning the products or services being 
exchanged (Hagiu & Wright, 2013; Parker, Van Alstyne & 
Choudary, 2016). Depending on the function being offered, a 
platform may bring together content publishers, drivers, merchants, 
advertisers, and a variety of other participants (Cusumano, Gawer & 
Yoffie, 2019a, 2019b; Evans & Gawer, 2016). The proliferation of 
transaction platforms “has enabled nearly every type of exchange 
imaginable in today’s world,” bringing to life the principle of 
“anything as a service” (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a). 
Transaction platforms generate value by decreasing search and 
transaction costs for involved participants, and generate revenue by 
charging transaction or advertising fees (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 
2019a, 2019b; Hagiu, 2014). With the accumulation of user behavior 
data, transaction platforms are able to match tailored services and 
products with appropriate sides of the market (Van Alstyne, Parker 
& Choudary, 2016). 
As with innovation platforms, the transaction platform’s role 
is to maximize value for its ecosystem participants. This entails 
controlling how many sides to bring on and when to bring them on, 
as well as setting guidelines for interactions to ensure a positive 
 ９ 
experience (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie 2019a, 2019b; Hagiu, 2014; Hagiu 
& Wright, 2015; Van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). Consequently, 
transaction platforms “often occupy privileged positions in their respective 
industries,” around which “most other industry participants revolve around 
and depend” (Hagiu, 2014). Platforms generally begin with one core 
interaction, initially focusing on maximizing its quality (Cusumano, Gawer 
& Yoffie, 2019a; Staykova & Damsgaard 2015; Van Alstyne, Parker & 
Choudary, 2016). Over time, platforms often add different interactions to 
increase the opportunities for value creation (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie 
2019a; Staykova & Damsgaard, 2017; Van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 
2016).  
While many of the earlier platforms have been innovation platforms, 
advances in digital technology have accelerated the growth of transaction 
platforms in the past decade (Cusumano, Gawer, and Yoffie, 2019a; Hagiu, 
2014; Evans & Gawer, 2016;). The most prominent examples include Uber, 
Google Search, Amazon Marketplace, and eBay, which all connect different 
parties within a market to interact directly with each other (Cusumano, 
Gawer, and Yoffie, 2019a; Evans & Gawer, 2016). In both of the two major 
research initiatives conducted to compile a list of platform businesses 
(Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a; Evans & Gawer, 2016), transaction 





Firms that operate both types of platforms are classified as 
integrated platforms (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a, 2019b; 
Evans & Gawer, 2016). This category includes some of the most 
powerful companies in the world, such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, 
Amazon, and Facebook, as they harness the benefits of both 
innovation and transaction platforms (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 
2019a, 2019b; Evans & Gawer, 2016). Though innovation and 
transaction platforms remained somewhat distinct from one another 
in the 1980s and 1990s, the number of integrated platform 
businesses is expected to increase, as firms increasingly desire 
control over the entire consumer interaction process (Cusumano, 
Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a, 2019b; Evans & Gawer, 2016). Innovation 
platforms establish transaction platforms to manage the distribution 
of complementary goods, just as Apple and Microsoft launched the 
App Store and the Play Store, respectively, to distribute applications 
for their device families. Transaction platforms seek to to expand 
their reach by creating innovation platforms. For example, Amazon 
developed several smart devices like Alexa, which, among a variety 
of other functions, allows users to purchase from Amazon’s 
marketplace through voice commands (Evans & Gawer, 2016; 
Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a). 
 
 １１ 
Common Traits of All Platforms 
Regardless of type, all platforms possess two key traits that 
differentiate them from non-platform businesses: their governance over an 
ecosystem and their possession of an installed base. The majority of non-
platform businesses operate on a pipeline model, in which business 
operations occur along a linear value chain: the firm at one end of the 
pipeline creates a product or service that is subsequently manufactured and 
distributed to consumers at the other end (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 
2016; Van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). Unlike in a platform 
ecosystem, the traditional pipeline model does not leave room for 
interaction between producers and end users, and maximizing value often 
entails maximizing sales (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016).  
The ecosystems present in platform business models create more 
complex relationships with greater opportunities for value creation (Parker, 
Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016). Ecosystems are broadly defined as the 
community of industry participants who interact with each other and evolve 
according to the governance rules set by the central company (Iansiti & 
Levien, 2004). This allows producers and end users to go beyond the 
boundaries of their usual roles and co-create value (Parker, Van Alstyne & 
Choudary, 2016). Innovation platforms like Intel would set the 
technological standards for hardware manufacturers, software developers, 
and other parties, ensuring that their outputs are compatible, which increases 
overall demand, as users desire compatibility (Eisenmann, Parker & Van 
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Alstyne, 2011). Intel also established the Intel Architecture Lab, 
whose engineers not only conducted innovation research for Intel, 
but also fostered innovation at complementary firms (Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2014). Transaction platform Uber connects drivers and 
passengers, establishing guidelines for interacting on the platform so 
that both groups act according to certain standards of behavior and 
enjoy a mutually beneficial experience. From the interactions 
between the two groups, Uber gains insight into user preferences—
for example, which types of drivers and passengers get high ratings 
and which price levels lead to the most conversion—that they can 
use to refine their interface, as well as add new capabilities, such as 
different types of rides at varying price levels or food delivery. 
Secondly, platform businesses possess an installed base, a 
segment of active users, which non-platform businesses lack (Wang 
& Xie, 2011; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). These active users 
provide platform businesses with consistent, often real-time data 
about user behavior and preferences (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 
2019a; Evans & Gawer, 2016). Furthermore, due to the presence of 
network effects, a firm’s installed base —and the consequent 
increase in the availability of complements—is the main mechanism 
driving firm market share (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; Evans, 2003; 
Hagiu, 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2003, 2006). Network effects are 
positive feedback loops that amplify the value of individual users in 
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a nonlinear manner (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a). For platforms 
whose utility increases with the number of users who have adopted them, 
more users not only draw more users who desire interaction, but also attract 
third-party developers seeking a large market for their products and services 
(Shapiro & Varian, 1999). Furthermore, the more users and complements 
that are available, the higher the switching costs of moving to a different 
platform that may have a smaller network of users and complementors. This 
locks in customers, and often triggers a positive feedback loop that leads to 
a winner-takes-all outcome for the dominant platform firms (Arthur, 1989; 
Eisenmann, 2006).  
 
Platform Businesses and Unrelated M&A 
Given that the majority of research in the M&A field highlights 
acquirer-target relatedness as a key variable in driving M&A target selection 
and eventual success, platform businesses’ propensity to acquire unrelated 
firms is a significant divergence from previous literature. M&A are a costly, 
risky undertaking for firms that have a dismal rate of success despite their 
popularity in use (Donaldson, 1990; Bergh, 1997; Bower, 2001; Bruner, 
2002; Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2005; Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Kim 
& Finklestein, 2009; Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013). Although M&A 
literature is fragmented, there is substantial consensus that business 
relatedness—defined as similarities in products, markets, and technologies 
between two firms— facilitates appropriate target selection, synergy 
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creation, and eventual M&A success (Datta, 1991; Finkelstein & 
Haleblian, 2002; Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Kim & Finklestein, 2009). 
A smaller gap in relatedness lowers barriers to combining operations, 
allowing merging firms to combine redundant processes and 
increase efficiency (Capasso & Meglio, 2005; Chakrabarti & 
Mitchell, 2013; Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Cartwright, 2006). 
A large gap in business relatedness obstructs both pre-
acquisition target evaluation and post-acquisition integration (Datta, 
1991; Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002; Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Kusewitt, 1985; Prahalad & Bettis). 
Consequently, it is all the more difficult to foresee and navigate the 
incredibly complex challenges that obstruct the merging of two firms 
with different cultures, management styles, internal processes, 
resources, and knowledge bases. Furthermore, prior research shows 
that transfer of firm-specific expertise and resources seldom happens 
in the case of unrelated acquisitions, hindering the expansion of firm 
capabilities (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013). Past research also 
shows that acquisitions of unrelated target firms have the worst 
performance history and the highest divesture rates (Kaplan & 
Weisbach, 1992; Porter, 1987). However, far from diminishing their 
power, unrelated acquisitions have seemingly contributed to the 
continuous growth of platform businesses. 
 １５ 
To understand this phenomenon, it is critical understand the different 
demands platform businesses face, which are more complicated and 
dynamic in contrast to non-platform businesses (Dolata, 2017; Van Alstyne, 
Parker & Choudary, 2016). First, instead of managing products, platform 
businesses must manage interactions between multiple groups—and ensure 
that value is always being generated in these interactions (Iansiti & Levien, 
2004; Van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). This not only entails 
maintaining quality control, but opening up new opportunities for ecosystem 
participants in new markets (Dolata, 2017). Second, competition in platform 
markets is unpredictable, as threats often emerge from “seemingly unrelated 
industries or from within the platform itself,” as complementors can become 
competitors at any moment (Van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). 
Therefore, companies must be prepared to both respond to and venture into 
seemingly distant industries to overcome such dynamics. 
In addition, platform markets are characterized by “extraordinary 
innovation dynamics and rapid trend changes” necessitating constant and 
rapid innovation (Dolata, 2017; Toppenberg, Henningsson & Eaton, 2016). 
Firms can only do so much internally without seeking external resources, 
especially when facing time constraints. Despite spending 15 percent of 
Cisco’s revenue on R&D, the innovation platform leader’s CEO John 
Chambers singled out the instances when internal R&D was sufficient to 
match market demand as the times when he was able to detect and adapt to 
new technological trends in their nascency (Chambers, 2015). Furthermore, 
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internal initiatives are often subject to path dependency, limiting the 
scope of innovation to previous knowledge held by the firm (Cyert 
& March, 1963). Internal R&D initiatives that are executed along an 
accelerated timeline to match the pace of innovation occurring in the 
industry also suffer from time compression diseconomies, which 
impedes the innovative potential of internally developed ideas 
(Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Penrose, 
1959; Teece, 1987). 
To overcome the limitations of internal initiatives, firms 
often seek external resources through M&A to bolster their efforts 
(Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013). Platform leaders have displayed a 
reliance on active acquisition programs as essential tools for 
innovating the platform core and to retain platform leadership, often 
choosing to buy up-and-coming technologies instead of cooperating 
with smaller players or building the technology on their own 
(Toppenberg, Henningsson & Eaton, 2016; Dolata, 2017). Therefore, 
this study predicts that platform businesses will display a higher 
propensity to engage in unrelated acquisitions than non-platform 
businesses.  
 
Hypothesis 1: When the acquiring firm is a platform business, the 
relatedness gap between the acquirer and the target will be larger. 
 
 １７ 
Installed Base and Unrelated M&A 
Although a large installed base can initially lead to market 
dominance, platform leadership is extremely difficult to maintain. 
Successful platform businesses are the exception rather than the norm 
(Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a, 2019b; Evans & Gawer, 2016; Hagiu, 
2014). The brief history of platform firms has shown many early movers in 
platform markets fail to retain their competitive positions, with leadership 
being exchanged through “sequential winner-take-all battles” (Evans, 2003; 
Evans & Schmalensee, 2001). In 2007, although Motorola, Nokia, Samsung, 
LG, and Sony Ericsson generated 90 percent of profits in the mobile phone 
manufacturing industry, late entrant Apple managed to singlehandedly gain 
92 percent of global industry profits and to emerge as the indisputable 
leader (Van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). In 2008, Facebook 
overtook MySpace, the original social media behemoth, in just four years, 
taking advantage of the former’s mismanagement (Van Alstyne, Parker & 
Choudary, 2016). Literature shows installed base advantage can be 
undermined by a means of creative destruction: when the innovative quality 
of platforms offered by entrants supersedes that of incumbents and 
consequently grants the former leadership in the market (Farrell & 
Klemperer, 2007; Liebowitz, 2002; Schmalensee, 2000). Therefore, it is 
imperative that platform leaders constantly strive to maintain their 
competitive advantage through aggressive and continuous innovation, of 
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which a prominent vehicle is M&A (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; 
Dolata, 2017). 
However, although technical superiority may enable a 
competitor to undermine an incumbent firm, a large installed base 
still provides significant advantages when expanding into new, 
unexplored markets. For example, although RealNetworks 
dominated more than 90 percent of the streaming media market in 
1998, it rapidly lost market share to Microsoft when the latter began 
bundling Windows Media Player (WMP) with its Windows 
operating system for personal computers and with its Windows NT 
operating system for enterprises (Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 
2011). The key here lies not in WMP’s technological advantage—it 
had none—but in Microsoft operating system’s installed base, which 
was large enough and overlapped enough with the user base for 
audio and video players to drive a virtual monopolist out of the 
market (Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2011). 
Therefore, platform businesses must accomplish two main 
objectives to remain competitive: remain at the forefront of rapid 
industrywide innovation and build and maintain a large installed 
base. The most powerful platform firms have amassed large installed 
bases and have expanded far beyond their core domains with 
aggressive acquisition programs (Dolata, 2017). Therefore, this 
study predicts that platform firms with a large installed base will 
 １９ 
display a greater propensity to pursue unrelated acquisitions compared to 
those with a smaller installed base. 
 
Hypothesis 2: When the acquiring firm has a large installed base, the 
relatedness gap between the target and the acquirer will be larger. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Empirical Context  
The hypothesized relationships were tested using a sample of 
mergers and acquisitions conducted between January 1, 2009 and December 
31, 2019 by the firms listed in the NASDAQ-100. The NASDAQ-100 
includes 100 of the largest technology, industrial, health care, consumer 
services, consumer goods, and industrial firms trading on the NASDAQ 
stock exchange. 19 firms fulfilled the criteria to be classified as a platform 
business, as established in earlier sections of the paper. An examination of 
other scholarly works by prominent researchers in the field corroborated this 
study’s classification. Table 5 presents a complete list of these 19 platform 
firms and their types. 
The NASDAQ-100 was chosen for several reasons. First, such a 
selection allows for the analysis of firms across all industries. This is 
significant because past studies have mainly performed case studies on 
certain firms or have focused on select industries (Cusumano, Gawer & 
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Yoffie, 2019b; Gawer, 2014; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017; 
Staykova & Damsgaard, 2017). Second, the index contains firms 
with large market capitalizations, who have been characterized in 
prior literature to “actively invest large amounts of capital in both 
alliances and acquisitions” (Wang & Zajac, 2007). Since all 
NASDAQ-100 member firms are of comparable market 
capitalizations, the index would allow for comparisons between 
platform and pipeline companies of similar scale, which only one 
prior study has done (Gawer, Yoffie & Cusumano, 2019b). Third, 
although platform businesses have grown tremendously in number 
and scale, many are still young companies who have not yet gone 
public or amassed large market capitalizations (Evans & Gawer, 
2016). With platform firms comprising around 20 percent, the 
NASDAQ-100 was the index that captured the most substantial 
proportion of platform firms that would be large and established 
enough to wield significant influence in their respective industries.  
 This study focuses on the time period between 2009 and 2019 for 
two main reasons. First, platform businesses, in their current manifestation, 
are a relatively new phenomena that have grown dramatically in number, 
economic significance, and industry reach in the past decade (Evans & 
Gawer, 2016; Gawer, Yoffie, and Cusumano, 2019a; Hagiu, 2014). This 
pattern of intense growth was reflected in the M&As of platform businesses, 
most of whom undertook their most highly valued acquisitions during this 
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window of observation. Second, given the rapidity of change that 
characterize the industries in which platform businesses operate, analyzing 
the most recent period as possible would yield the most pertinent insights 
into how platform businesses have and will continue to pursue M&A. 
Using the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database, 
1,026 M&A transactions were identified to have been completed by member 
firms of the NADSAQ-100 during the sampling period. The announcement 
dates of the deals were used to record the occurrence of these events. 
Pending and rumored deals were omitted from the sample. 80 of the 100 
companies listed in the index completed M&A deals during the window of 
observation. Furthermore, although 19 firms in the NASDAQ-100 were 
classified as platform businesses, only 11 conducted M&A during this 
study’s window of observation. More specifically, the 11 platform 
businesses completed 524 acquisitions, and the remaining 69 non-platform 




The dependent variable is the relatedness gap, calculated using the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code-based measure of relatedness between 
the acquiring and target firms, which is the most common method of 
assessment (Morck, Shleifer & Wishny, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999; Wang & Zajac, 2007; Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Makri, Hitt & Lane, 
 ２２ 
2011). Following the 5-tiered method used by Wang and Zajac (2007), the 
dependent variable was assigned the following values: 0 (if the first digit of 
the two firms’ SIC codes are different), 0.25 (if the first digit of the two 
firms’ SIC codes is the same), 0.5 (if the first two digits of the two firms’ 
SIC codes are the same), 0.75 (if the first three digits of the two firms’ SIC 
codes are the same), and 1 (if all four digits of the digits of the two firms 
SIC codes are the same). An acquisition was categorized as unrelated if the 
value was 0.25 or lower, as is commonly defined in the management field 
(Palepu, 1985; Bergh, 1997; Wang & Zajac, 2007). 
 
Independent variables 
Acquirer business type. To examine the differences between the M&A 
behaviors of platform and non-platform companies, this study divided and 
coded the sample firms according to their business model. Acquirer business 
type is a binary variable, coded as 1 if the acquiring firm operated on a 
platform model and 0 if it did not.  
 
Installed base. To examine the impact of a larger or smaller installed base 
on the likelihood and frequency of pursuing unrelated acquisitions, this 
study calculated the size of the installed base as the total sum of a firm’s 
monthly active users across each of the platforms a firm operates. Each 




In addition to the independent variables, this study includes a 
number of controls for characteristics relevant to the acquirer or transaction. 
For acquiring firm traits, we controlled for the following variables. Acquirer 
total assets is a proxy for acquirer size. According to past studies, larger 
firms usually possess more resources, personnel, and institutional processes 
that allow them to undertake more complicated acquisitions (Laamanen & 
Keil, 2008). Acquirer M&A experience counted the number of M&A 
transactions the acquirer undertook five years prior to the research period, in 
an effort to control for the effect of experience on the propensity to select 
unrelated acquisition targets. This paper follows the methods employed in 
previous M&A literature (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999; Kusewitt, 1985; Laamanen & Keil, 2008).  
For transaction traits, we controlled for the following variables. 
Share acquired addressed the percentage acquired in the transaction. 
Number of bidders counted the number of acquiring firms vying for the 
same target firm. Prior research has shown the presence of competing bids 
to influence target selection (Datta, Narayanan & Pinches, 1992; Capron & 
Shen, 2007). International M&A was a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the 
deal was a cross-border acquisition and 0 if not. As in other acquisition 
studies, this controls for the idiosyncrasies of the U.S. market (Capron & 
Shen 2007), which some researchers have viewed as being more active than 
others (Schneper & Guillen, 2004). Finally, year dummy variables for each 
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year in the observation period were included to control for any 
time-specific variations. Prior work has also controlled for the 
potential effects of macroeconomic conditions on M&A activity in 
this manner (Haunschild, 1993; Hablebian & Finkelstein, 1999). 
 
Analysis 
The hypothesized relationships were analyzed using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression. For Hypothesis 1, which 
tests the impact of acquirer business type on the relatedness gap 
between the acquiring and target firms, OLS was conducted using 
the full sample of 1,026 M&A transactions completed by all 
member firms of the NASDAQ-100 between 2009 and 2019. For 
the second hypothesis, OLS was conducted using the sample of 339 
M&A transactions completed by only platform businesses in the 
NASDAQ-100 within the sampling timeframe. Non-platform 
companies do not possesses installed bases, and were therefore 
excluded from the second regression examining the impact of 
installed base size on the relatedness gap. Although platform 
companies completed 524 acquisitions during the study period, 185 
transactions were removed from the sample due to missing installed 





 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for the 
variables examined in the first regression, performed on the full sample of 
1,026 M&A transactions conducted by all NASDAQ-100 firms between 
2009 and 2019. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for 
the variables examined in the second regression, performed on the sample of 
339 M&A transactions conducted by platform businesses in the NASDAQ-
100 during the study period. There are no problems with multicollinearity. 
 
Results of hypothesis tests 
Table 3 presents the results of the first OLS regression conducted 
with the full sample of 1,026 M&A deals. Column (1) presents the base 
model with just control variables, of which acquirer total assets and 
acquirer M&A experience are shown to be statistically significant. The 
relationship between acquirer business type, which indicates whether or not 
the acquiring firm is a platform business, and relatedness, which measures 
the degree of acquirer-target industry relatedness, is shown to be negative 
(𝜷 = -0.201) and extremely significant (p<0.001), indicating a large 
relatedness gap. This result strongly supports Hypothesis 1, which predicted 
that platform businesses are more likely than non-platform businesses to 
pursue acquisitions with a large relatedness gap. 
 ２６ 
Table 4 presents the results of the second OLS regression 
conducted with the platform-only sample of 339 M&A deals. The 
baseline model in column (1) shows number of bidders, acquirer 
total assets, acquirer M&A experience, and certain years to be 
statistically significant. The relationship between acquirer business 
type, which indicates whether or not the acquiring firm is a platform 
business, and relatedness, which measures the degree of acquirer-
target industry relatedness, is shown to be negative (𝜷 = -0.056) and 
highly significant (p<0.001), indicating a large relatedness gap. This 
result strongly supports Hypothesis 2, which predicted that a large 
installed base possessed by the acquiring firm will enlarge the 
relatedness gap between the acquiring and target firms. However, 
this result is not without significant shortcomings. As mentioned 
before, a significant portion of the installed base database contained 
missing values, reducing the sample size of platform M&A deals 
substantially, from 524 transactions to 339. 
 ２７ 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (all firms) 
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Relatedness 0.54 0.43 
      
2. Acquirer business type 0.51 0.50 -0.19** 
     
3. Share acquired 96.54 15.51 0.03 0.03 
    
4. Number of bidders 1.00 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.01 
   
5. Acquirer total assets 49875.40 66776.88 -0.19** 0.57** 0.05 0.00 
  
6. Acquirer M&A experience 2.70 1.06 0.06 0.51** 0.12** -0.01 0.27** 
 
7. International M&A 0.32 0.47 -0.05 -0.03 -.08* 0.04 0.01 0.00 
Two-tailed test. N=1026.                 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1                 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (platform firms) 
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Relatedness 0.55 0.40 
      
2. Installed base 6.20 1.52 0.01 
     
3. Share acquired 99.02 7.96 0.04 -0.05 
    
4. Number of bidders 1.00 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 
   
5. Acquirer total assets 95758.26 88830.44 -0.19** 0.30** 0.04 0.03 
  
6. Acquirer M&A experience 3.25 1.06 0.43** 0.33** 0.05 0.03 -0.15** 
 
7. International M&A 0.29 0.45 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.10 -0.10 
Two-tailed test. N=339.   




Table 3. Regression results for relatedness (all firms)   
  (1) (2) 
Variables Relatedness Relatedness 
      
Share acquired 0.001 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of bidders 0.119 0.087 
  (0.244) (0.240) 
Acquirer total assets -0.000*** -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Acquirer M&A experience 0.045** 0.079*** 
  (0.014) (0.015) 
International M&A -0.039 -0.046 
  (0.028) (0.028) 
Acquirer business type   -0.201*** 
    (0.036) 
2010.Year 0.035 0.032 
  (0.065) (0.064) 
2011.Year 0.065 0.060 
  (0.062) (0.061) 
2012.Year 0.021 0.006 
  (0.065) (0.064) 
2013.Year -0.093 -0.096 
  (0.065) (0.064) 
2014.Year 0.060 0.048 
  (0.064) (0.063) 
2015.Year 0.044 0.025 
  (0.066) (0.065) 
2016.Year 0.071 0.045 
  (0.069) (0.068) 
2017.Year -0.043 -0.077 
  (0.072) (0.071) 
2018.Year 0.033 -0.000 
  (0.071) (0.071) 
2019.Year -0.052 -0.105 
  (0.143) (0.141) 
Constant 0.307 0.354 
  (0.264) (0.260) 
      
Observations 1,026 1,026 
R-squared 0.065 0.093 
Standard errors in parentheses     




Table 4. Regression results for relatedness (platform firms) 
  (1) (2) 
Variables Relatedness Relatedness 
      
Share acquired 0.001 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of bidders -0.632+ -0.705* 
  (0.355) (0.349) 
Acquirer total assets -0.000*** -0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Acquirer M&A experience 0.171*** 0.207*** 
  (0.020) (0.022) 
International M&A 0.027 0.026 
  (0.043) (0.042) 
Installed base   -0.056*** 
    (0.015) 
2010.Year 0.145 0.226+ 
  (0.121) (0.121) 
2011.Year 0.098 0.190 
  (0.119) (0.119) 
2012.Year 0.236+ 0.357** 
  (0.125) (0.126) 
2013.Year 0.055 0.133 
  (0.118) (0.118) 
2014.Year 0.200+ 0.286* 
  (0.117) (0.118) 
2015.Year 0.206+ 0.264* 
  (0.123) (0.122) 
2016.Year 0.230+ 0.339* 
  (0.130) (0.131) 
2017.Year 0.396** 0.545*** 
  (0.137) (0.141) 
2018.Year 0.330* 0.446** 
  (0.137) (0.138) 
2019.Year 0.563* 0.689* 
  (0.280) (0.276) 
Constant 0.455 0.727 
  (0.445) (0.442) 
      
Observations 339 339 
R-squared 0.260 0.290 
Standard errors in parentheses     




Table 5. List of platform firms and types 
Acquiror Name Platform Type 
Amazon.com Inc Integrated 
Apple Inc Integrated 
Baidu Inc Transaction 
Booking Holdings Inc Transaction 
Cisco Systems Inc Innovation 
Ctrip.Com International Ltd Transaction 
eBay Inc Transaction 
Expedia Group Inc Transaction 
Facebook Inc Integrated 
Google Inc Integrated 
Intel Corp Innovation 
Intuit Inc Transaction 
JD.com Inc Transaction 
Microsoft Corp Integrated 
NetEase Inc Transaction 
Nvidia Corp Innovation 
Paypal Inc Transaction 
Qualcomm Inc Innovation 






This study contributes to management literature in several important 
ways. First, this study delineates and analyzes a major departure from the 
dominant logic of M&A literature: the centrality of target-acquirer industry 
relatedness in driving deal creation, which has been considered a core tenet 
in the field for decades. Second, this study is the first to call attention to and 
empirically analyze the M&A strategies of platform businesses, which are 
not only significant in their divergence from traditional theory, but in their 
economic impacts as well. Third, this study contributes to a much-needed 
and emerging stream of research that analyzes platform businesses through 
an integrative lens. Fourth, this study produces empirical results that are 
generalizable across multiple industries. As mentioned previously, the 
majority of past empirical studies on platform businesses were limited to 
single-industry settings (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). 
 Both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 were strongly supported by the 
results of the regression, advancing the position that platform businesses are 
more likely than non-platform businesses to pursue acquisitions of firms 
with a larger relatedness gap, and that the magnitude of a platform firm’s 
installed base exacerbates this tendency. However, as previously mentioned, 
the results of the second regression are flawed due to missing values in the 
installed bases of certain platform businesses, either for the entire duration 
of the observation period or for select years. Installed base data is tricky to 
 ３２ 
gather, with many firms only releasing figures at favorable points in time 
and not on a regular basis. Furthermore, for innovation platforms, who often 
produce critical components for finished products or services, the installed 
base is difficult to calculate as platform firms do not disclose all, if any, of 
the companies they sell their parts to. Therefore, although the installed base 
of a platform business is a fundamental and distinguishing feature of the 
platform model that drives a firm’s competitive position, significant hurdles 
in its data collection hinder its utility as a variable within an empirical study. 
 Given that this paper is the first to examine the M&A activities of 
platform businesses, much remains unexplored. Platform businesses 
continue to grow in scale and scope, and non-platform businesses are 
increasingly partaking in similar M&A behavior and launching platforms of 
their own, indicating the ongoing relevance of this subject (Cusumano, 
Gawer & Yoffie, 2019a; Evans & Gawer, 2016). Future researchers may 
benefit from analyzing platform M&A using a more global sample of 
platform businesses. Although the NASDAQ-100 includes both U.S. and 
non-U.S. firms, the majority of the platform business included in the index 
were U.S. firms. Platform businesses have become a global phenomenon, 
and a significant number of influential platform businesses have emerged in 
Asia, so a global perspective is necessary to provide a more holistic picture. 
Furthermore, a more detailed analysis of the specific M&A behaviors of 
each type of platform may also yield valuable insights into the 
particularities of the platform model. Finally, this study attempted to but 
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was limited in its efforts to calculate the total sizes of each platform 
business’s ecosystem by taking into account not simply end users, but also 
other ecosystem participants such as third-party developers and advertisers. 
A working paper by the leading researchers in this field also encountered 
similar obstacles in data collection due to the lack of available information 
(Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019b). It is difficult to make a clean division 
between the platform-oriented aspects of a firm from its other aspects, and 
even when such a distinction is possible, many companies have only 
recently begun reporting such figures. Future researchers who are able to 
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본 연구는 연관성이 낮은 기업을 인수합병(unrelated M&A)을 
하는 플랫폼(platform) 기업의 M&A 전략을 조사한다. 이전의 연구들은 
미국을 비롯한 각국의 대기업이 사업연관성(business relatedness)이 
높은 기업을 인수함으로써 시너지를 창출(synergy creation)해왔다고 
분석했다. 하지만 구글, 아마존, 페이스북, 애플, 마이크로소프트와 같은 
플랫폼 기업들은 오히려 사업 연관성이 낮은 기업을 M&A 함으로써 
성장하고 있다. 이번 연구는 그러한 이유를 분석하기 위해 비플랫폼 
(non-platform) 사업과 구별되는 플랫폼 사업의 두 가지 근본적인 
특징, 즉 생태계(ecosystem) 구축과 설치기반(installed base) 보유에 
대해 면밀히 조사한다. 구체적으로, 나스닥 100 지수(NASDAQ-100)에 
상장된 기업이 2009 부터 2019 년까지 진행한 1,027 건의 인수 합병을 
실증적으로 분석함으로써, 플랫폼 기업이 전통적인 
파이프라인(pipeline) 기업보다 사업 연관성이 떨어지는 
피인수기업(target firm)을 선택하는 경향이 있고, 이러한 기질은 
플랫폼 기업의 설치기반의 규모가 증가하면서 강화된다고 검증하였다. 
이러한 결과는 플랫폼 사업의 M&A 전략을 최초로 다산업적 맥락에서 
통계적으로 실험하였다는 방법론적 기여와, 플랫폼에 대한 3 가지 
유형분류와 통합적 이해를 제공한다는 이론적 기여점을 나타낸다.  
 
주요어 : 플랫폼 기업, 인수합병, 비관련형 M&A, 플랫폼 M&A 
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